In a couple of weeks, it will be six years since a Government expert body made a series of urgent recommendations on national security.
The Commission on the Future of Policing in Ireland called for an overarching national security structure and for greater investment in An Garda Síochána’s security capabilities.
The report was published in September 2018 and, that December, the Government produced its implementation plan — A Policing Service for the Future.
So, how many of those recommendations have been implemented? And, against the background of the first suspected Islamist attack in Ireland, an increased threat from far-right extremism, and various threats posed by Russia, just what shape are Irish security services in?
The report pointed out that the “nature of the threat to national security is changing”, with the long-running threat from domestic terrorism receding but the threat from international terrorism “much greater”.
It pointed out that places that were previously safe — sports arenas, shopping streets, seaside promenades, beaches, concert halls, and restaurants — were now soft targets in open societies.
It highlighted the threat from radicalisation of individuals, not least online, and danger from cyberattacks, whether from foreign agencies, terrorists, or criminals, with the threat not only to State bodies but also foreign tech companies based in Ireland.
The commission made the fundamental point that national security should not be lodged within An Garda Síochána — and pointed out that other countries typically had various agencies and a national security adviser co-ordinating them and reporting to the head of government.
The report said Ireland had “no permanent structure” and that one was needed to bring the agencies together, pool information on the threats to the State, and develop a national security strategy.
It recommended:
- The “immediate” creation of a national centre within the Department of the Taoiseach to collect and analyse intelligence and co-ordinate the various intelligence agencies;
- The Strategic Threat Analysis Centre would have a small permanent staff supplemented by personnel from An Garda Síochána, Defence Forces, Department of Foreign Affairs, and Department of Communications (where the National Cyber Security Centre sits);
- The body would provide “regular threat analyses” and long-term threat assessments, and develop intelligence-gathering requirements for gardaí and Defence Forces and ensure there is “no overlap” between them
- Garda Security and Intelligence “must be strengthened”, in particular through a “ring-fenced budget”;
- The section must have the ability to recruit specialist expertise — analytical, technological, and legal — “directly and quickly”.
- The recommendations for the gardaí were a “matter of urgency”;
- A national security co-ordinator should head a new Strategic Threat Analysis Centre, answering directly to the Taoiseach. This position should be a senior official and be a “full-time role;
- The co-ordinator should have the authority to convene inter-agency meetings and “draw up annual intelligence requirements”;
- The National Cyber Security Centre should answer directly to this co-ordinator and taken out of Department of Communications;
- The creation of an Independent Examiner of Terrorist and Serious Crime Legislation — a new authority, based on the British model, with sweeping powers of access, reporting to the Taoiseach.
The commission said it examined carefully whether to set up a separate security agency, but concluded it wasn’t convinced this approach was “either necessary or realistic”, but added that it could be an option “at some future point”.
In relation to the proposed Strategic Threat Analysis Centre (STAC), it set the priorities as the appointment of the National Security Co-ordinator, the identification of secure premises, the procurement of IT systems, and staffing — all by March 2019.
It said by the close of 2019, the Strategic Threat Analysis Centre should publish its first strategic analysis reports and engage with agencies on a national security strategy.
Regarding Garda Security and Intelligence capability, the priorities were to develop a Garda perspective on what was required by the end of 2019.
In April 2019, the job for the new national security co-ordinator was advertised — but the name of the position had changed.
The job was now director of the National Security Analysis Centre (NSAC) — the new name for the Strategic Threat Analysis Centre.
“The person is no longer national security co-ordinator, but director of the centre,” the security source said, adding that this meant the appointee is “not really responsible”.
The advertisement said the director would be of assistant secretary rank and would report to the secretary general of the Department of the Taoiseach.
The job would have an international role and the National Security Analysis Centre would be a “permanent structure” bringing together the various agencies.
It would produce a comprehensive picture of threats, develop an integrated national security strategy, and co-ordinate the work of the agencies.
However, it turned out that Mr Woods was also appointed assistant secretary for the Government Secretariat and Parliamentary Liaison Unit.
He is charged with “co-ordinating the business of Government meetings”, in charge of dealings with the Oireachtas, and also deals with the Office of the President and Government departments.
That is enough of a full-time job.
A deputy director, in the form of cybersecurity official Richard Browne, was appointed in October 2020. He left in July 2021.
In a statement, the Department of the Taoiseach said the position was filled two years later, in 2023, by Orlaith Fitzmaurice, a senior official from the Department of Foreign Affairs, who was seconded on “a full-time basis”.
Despite multiple efforts by the
over the years, the Department of the Taoiseach has declined to provide details on its staffing levels, budget, or if it has a dedicated premises.While initially staff from security agencies and departments were seconded to it, it is understood the gardaí do not have staff seconded.
It is also thought that the National Security Analysis Centre does not even have a dedicated premises of its own, as set out under the Government’s plan.
In a submission last year to the Consultative Forum on International Security Policy, Dónal Gallagher, first secretary in the EU division in the Department of Foreign Affairs, said the National Security Analysis Centre “does not sit in any meaningful way” and that four years after its establishment “does not even own a premises”.
The
also understands that there is a reluctance among security agencies to share sensitive intelligence with the centre, because they do not believe its physical premises and IT systems are sufficiently secure.A key recommendation to set intelligence priorities for the agencies and ensure there is no duplication or crossover does not appear to have happened.
It is believed that both gardaí and military intelligence have urged the need for legal and strategic clarity and guidance of their respective roles — with the Defence Forces continuing to be frustrated by the absence of a statutory definition of its internal security roles — a matter raised by the Commission on Defence Forces and judicial oversight reports.
This includes the co-ordination role of the centre and a detailed intelligence picture of the full range of national security threats, as well as the roles, responsibilities, requirements, and planned investment in the various security agencies.
The overarching strategy was supposed to be published at the end of 2021 and was set to cover the period 2020-2025.
The Department of the Taoiseach has said that covid and ongoing international and domestic developments have delayed its publication.
Research for this article found that these reasons do not wash with the various security services, or academics working in the security field and politicians interested in security matters.
“Officials do what officials do, they hold meetings, do drafts and redrafts and seek observations on each draft,” one security source said. “They have been doing that since 2019.”
Donncha O’Connell, professor of law at University of Galway and former member of the Commission on the Future of Policing in Ireland, has consistently criticised the failures, as well as the Independent Examiner, and said that the centre should be set up on a statutory footing.
Ben Tonra, of UCD, and Andrew Cottey, of UCC, added their voices of dismay.
As the national security strategy is awaited, the country has seen the publication of the Commission on Defence Forces, the report of the Consultative Forum on International Security, the National Risk Assessment, and most recently the Defence Policy Review.
In his submission, Mr Gallagher, a former Defence Forces commandant, who was writing in a personal capacity, said that centre, Military Intelligence, or Garda National Crime and Security Intelligence Service [GNCSIS] do not share their analysis with the Oireachtas Justice Committee [as happens in many other Western countries], nor do they publish annual reports — adding that the various agencies “work in silos”.
Mr Cottey said: “The NSAC is something of a strange institutional beast, as it seems to deal with both policy-making and intelligence collation and assessment, whereas in most states these roles are separated.
“What Ireland really lacks is a proper intelligence agency or service capable of providing intelligence, including confidential and sensitive information, to the Government and, as appropriate, to members of Dáil Éireann.”
In relation to the “urgent need” to strengthen Garda Security and Intelligence there is sparse public information available, but the
understands that little has changed.Not only is there no ring-fenced budget, the issue appears to be “off the agenda”.
The Garda National Crime and Security Intelligence Service, like every other section of the organisation, competes for resources — and the biggest issue for politicians and the public is visible policing on the streets and in communities.
“Drew [Harris] doesn’t have resources,” one security source said, “and whatever he has, he throws it where people are screaming the most, whether that is Dublin city centre, dealing with protests or roads policing — and really that’s no surprise.”
Garda Commissioner Drew Harris has on a number of occasions said there were not enough gardaí to meet the increasing demands of the organisation.
The Garda National Crime and Security Intelligence Service — which includes both intelligence and operational units — has not grown and there appears to have been little in the way of significant investment in its capabilities.
As per the Government’s policing plan, various submissions have been sent by Garda HQ to the Department of Justice and onward to the Department of Public Expenditure — with correspondence and observations back and forward, but little actual progress.
A recommendation on the recruitment of specialists into the service “directly and quickly” also hasn’t progressed, although this appears to be tied up with wider and complicated issues regarding civil servants and civilians being employees of An Garda Síochána — as opposed to civil servants in the wider public service.
The implementation of employment provisions in the Policing, Security and Community Safety Act 2024 is thought to be needed before there can be direct recruitment into the Garda National Crime and Security Intelligence Service.
A possible option for the Garda National Crime and Security Intelligence Service is a model along the lines of the Criminal Assets Bureau (Cab).
The bureau is a separate corporate and statutory body, with a high degree of independence from the gardaí, although the bureau chief still reports to the Garda Commissioner.
It has its own budget from the Department of Justice and can, and does, hire directly from the market for the likes of forensic accountants, digital forensics, and financial analysts.
The bureau is comprised of gardaí, Revenue, and Department of Social Protection officials on secondment and the three agencies work together physically in teams — so there are no silos.
Denmark is the most recent country to separate national security out from the police service — in its case from the Danish police force into a new Danish Security and Intelligence Service.
With a budget of €143m in 2023, it reports directly to the Danish minister of justice.
Within it, there is a centre for terror analysis, which also includes officials from the Danish defence intelligence service, the ministry for foreign affairs, and the emergency management agency.
“The structures here are suited to a long time ago when there were only two threats — Northern Ireland and Britain,” a security source said.
“The Commission on the Future of Policing in Ireland was probably the last chance to get things right in the gardaí, otherwise we could be stepping towards a separate agency, like an Irish MI5 [the British security service].”
The source added: “But this begs the basic question: What have the governments done since the Commission on the Future of Policing in Ireland? What improvements have been made to the legislation and resources? The answer is not much.”
The source said: “All the while the threat landscape has expanded — the HSE cyberattack, the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Russian ships off our coast, foreign espionage, radicalisation, the far-right, and disinformation, not to mention energy security and critical infrastructure and more.”
On the back of the threats to politicians, not least the head of Government, and the first suspected Islamist attack in Ireland, things may change in the political corridors of power.
While the threat of a terrorist attack in Ireland remains "moderate", this month the sub-threat from political extremism was raised to "substantial"
“Recent events should be a wake-up call,” a separate security source said.
“We can’t even patrol our waters, where we have sub-sea cables, any interference with which could have massive real and reputational consequences for Ireland, not only in damage to Ireland but also to Europe.”
The source added: “It all gets caught up in disputes over neutrality when really this is about looking after our own security and ensuring it is what it needs to be.
“It’s time to cop on.”