The attack was Iran’s long expected response to the recent spate of assassinations and airstrikes against Hezbollah and Hamas’s political and military leaders in Damascus, Tehran, Beirut, and the southern coastal towns of Sidon and Tyre. 

The Iranian response however, against multiple targets appears to be another “demonstration response” similar to the attack on Israel in April. 

That attack was carefully planned to avoid casualties, but to have a psychological impact on the Israeli population. The April attack involved a mix of 300 ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and slow flying drones, which gave the Iranians the opportunity to test out the Israeli Iron Dome, air defence, system. Had the Iranians intended to inflict casualties they would have concentrated on only a few targets and used a wave of decoys to draw out fire, to overwhelm the Iron Dome system. 

The conclusion is that Iran does not want an all out war with Israel.  

Also, on Tuesday night, the Israeli embassy in Stockholm was closed after an explosion was heard and the embassy was hit by a number of bullets. On Wednesday at 3am two explosions were heard near the Israeli embassy in Copenhagen. A Jewish school nearby was  cordoned off. There were no casualties in either incident and, so far, no arrests. The timing of both incidents could be linked to Rosh Hashanah, the Jewish new year, which continues throughout Thursday and Friday.

It could be both incidents are part of a coordinated protest against the Israeli invasion of southern Lebanon. This anticipated limited ground offensive, by the IDF, began on Monday evening after sunset. 

In a night operation under cover of artillery fire, tanks and mechanised infantry advanced on pre-identified Hezbollah positions in the area of the Israeli border with Lebanon, to the Litani River, a distance of 30km. 

The IDF announced Hezbollah had planned a October 7, Hamas-style, attack on the population of northern Israel, code named “Conquer the Galilee”.

In preparation for its operation, Hezbollah had, according to the IDF spokesman, turned Lebanese villages into military bases. The limited IDF operation was to pre-empt the Hezbollah attack to facilitate the safe return of Israeli residents to their homes in the border area.

Israeli airstrikes continue against Hezbollah targets in Southern Lebanon, Beirut, the Bekaa valley (Eastern Lebanon), in Syria, against Hamas targets in Gaza and against Houthi forces in Yemen. Israel’s detailed war objectives in Lebanon are still unknown, in particular their exit strategy.

The Lebanese Army has withdrawn northwards from the invasion zone. Unifil has suspended patrolling, and its personnel are largely back in base.

On Monday, the Lebanese prime minister announced the Lebanese Army was ready to implement UN Security Council Resolution 1701. This resolution was passed in 2006 at the end of the Israel-Hezbollah War. 

It provides for the withdrawal of Hezbollah to the North of the Litani River and the withdrawal of the IDF to the Blue Line (the boundary with Israel). Under Resolution 1701, no armed forces, other than the Lebanese Army and Unifil, were to be in the buffer zone, the area between the blue line and the Litani River. 

It also provides that, on request from the Lebanese Army, Unifil is required to assist the army. Unifil’s mandate was changed to allow it to use force to carry out this new task.

Some commentators dismissed Resolution 1701 as an excuse offered by the US to get Israel to agree to withdraw the IDF. The Israelis withdrew but Hezbollah gradually returned in small numbers, to the area. Unifil was not mandated to act against Hezbollah, unless requested by the Lebanese Government. 

The Lebanese Army, even assisted by an enlarged Unifil, was never strong enough to go to war with Hezbollah. 

Moreover, Hezbollah, by 2006, was well embedded in Lebanon’s political structure. The drafters of 1701 knew perfectly well, that as long as Hezbollah was militarily strong, the Lebanese Government would not move against Hezbollah, in the buffer zone, nor request Unifil’s assistance to do so. 

Hezbollah’s recent setbacks have shifted the balance of military power in Lebanon. It gives the Lebanese government the opportunity to implement its responsibilities under Resolution 1701.

Hezbollah‘s military capabilities have been seriously degraded by the exploding pagers which, Hezbollah has admitted, wounded 1,500 of its fighters. The top tier of its military leadership and its political leader have being killed in air attacks. Many of its rocket launchers, and munitions depots have been destroyed or put out of action. With its communications systems compromised, in the short term, Hezbollah will only be capable of reduced operations.

Like most long standing paramilitary organisations, it would, however, have had contingency plans to survive. It is to be expected there will be “designated survivors”, a list of agreed successors to ensure continuity of its military and political leadership. 

Its launch sites and logistics support would have been dispersed in multiple locations, not concentrated. Its supply routes from Iran across Syria will probably need to be changed. With its money and manpower resources it will be able to recover its personnel losses.

Hezbollah withdrawing north of the Litani River, as proposed in UN Security Council Resolution 1701 (2006), will not, alone, guarantee the security of northern Israel. Hezbollah has a huge inventory of rockets missiles and drones, some of which can reach any part of Israel. 

The obvious question is what is Israel’s war aim in respect of Hezbollah? Will the Israeli government adopt the destruction of Hezbollah as a war aim, as it has with Hamas?

Israel has another front to contend with. Not for the first time, on Saturday, Iran’s Houthi allies in Yemen fired a ballistic missile towards Israel. It was timed to arrive around the same time as Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s plane was returning to Ben Gurian Airport from New York. It travelled 1,900km from Yemen before being intercepted by an Israeli Arrow missile, above the atmosphere, and destroyed. 

Parts of the missile fell in the Jerusalem area. Houthi claims it was a hypersonic ballistic missile and that it covered the distance in 11 minutes, are discounted by western experts. The Israeli response was quick. 

On Sunday, an IDF air strike hit a power station and oil depots in the Houthi controlled city of Hodeidah and the nearby Port of Ras Isa.

The ruthlessness with which Israel is conducting the wars against Hamas and Hezbollah continues to dominate the headlines. It matches the ruthlessness shown by Hamas and Hezbollah over the past four decades. Everyone is anxiously wondering where and when the carnage will end. 

Some commentators still believe the key to stabilise the security situation in Lebanon is to achieve a deal over Gaza. In the meantime, the death toll in Gaza is more than 41,500, in Israel more than 1,600, in Lebanon, more than 1,000 and on the West Bank more than 600. The deal over Gaza has been superseded by events in Lebanon.

US president Joe Biden has persuaded Netanyahu to limit his current incursion to the Litani River. The current IDF offensive may remove the threat of a Hezbollah ground attack against northern Israel but will not provide security against the threat posed by Hezbollah’s medium range rockets, missiles and drones. 

This threat can only be removed by extending the IDF operation further north and east or by reaching agreement with Hezbollah. Perhaps by a combination of both?

In the meantime, Israel’s foreign relations with its allies, including the US, are deteriorating. However, let us remember General Moshe Dayan’s defiant comment: “Israel does not have a foreign policy, only a defence policy with foreign implications” 

• Dorcha Lee is a retired army colonel and defence analyst