An estimated 30,000 people were fleeing Afghanistan weekly before the Taliban takeover and this figure is likely to increase significantly according to UNHCR. This will mostly affect Pakistan, Iran and Turkey who already host millions of Afghans between them and may prove costly in political, social and economic terms. Nonetheless, Pakistan’s prime minister, Imran Khan, welcomed the Taliban victory tweeting that Afghanistan had ‘broken the shackles of slavery’.

Complex relations

Pakistan has a long, complex history with Afghanistan going right back to its inception in 1947 and its inheritance of the border between British India and Afghanistan. It supported Afghan mujahedeen in the 1980s resisting the Soviet occupation and thereafter the Taliban, always favouring Islamists over nationalists in the belief they would be more anti-India. Islamabad’s policies are driven largely by its fractious relationship with India. Since the bloody partition of British India, Pakistan has fought numerous wars with India and blames its much larger neighbour for the succession of East Pakistan (now Bangladesh). Islamabad sees New Delhi as an existential threat attempting to precipitate its dismemberment by fomenting successionist movements in Balochistan and Pashtunistan. Islamabad is gambling on the Taliban not pursuing irredentist claims on Pakistani territory. However, empowering the Taliban could backfire fuelling extremism within Pakistan and instability in its backyard.

Pakistan’s nemesis, India, will be more unsettled by the new political order in Afghanistan. It was a major backer of the government of Ashraf Ghani – the only other democracy in the region. It has invested substantially in Afghan infrastructure projects since 2001 building roads, hospitals and even the Afghan parliament building. If the return of the Taliban is a ‘win’ for Pakistan it will be perceived as a ‘loss’ for India. There will be concerns about Afghanistan becoming, once again, a base for anti-India jihadists. India, however, will be more perturbed about any benefits accruing to its regional rival, China – Beijing has already held talks with the Taliban while New Delhi’s history with the Taliban is troubled. Tensions between India and China date back to the 1950s and, in the past two years, skirmishes have broken out leading to deaths of soldiers from both sides. The struggle between these economic powerhouses for advantage in Afghanistan will be one to watch.

Opportunity for China

China will see the US departure along with its liberal democratic notions as an opportunity to extend its influence in the region. Largely for self-serving reasons, China has a policy of strict respect for sovereignty and non-interference in other states internal affairs so the Taliban’s human rights record will not deter engagement. Afghanistan’s natural resources are attractive and there may be an opportunity to develop Belt and Road projects, but China will be wary of any instability. The Taliban’s Islamist nature is problematic for China too. The Sino-Afghan border is just 74 km wide straddling a narrow, remote, mountainous region called the Wahkan Corridor adjoining the Xinjiang Province on the Chinese side. Beijing has characterised separatists in Xinjiang as Islamic extremists and used this label to justify its repression of the Uighurs. It too will be worried about Afghanistan providing a haven for insurgents.

Russian credentials

This will also be a concern for Moscow. In the late 1970s, the USSR’s fear of jihadist ideology spilling over its borders and radicalising the Muslim populations of its Central Asian Republics influenced its decision to invade Afghanistan. Later, following 9/11, Russia supported US efforts in Afghanistan for the same reason. However, the Taliban has offered assurances to Moscow around border security and terrorist activity. Russia has increased its involvement in Afghanistan in the past decade – deepening its diplomatic, cultural and economic ties to bolster its soft power. Russia has considerable history and experience with Afghanistan dating back to the 1950s. Then, and later during the 1980s occupation, Soviet infrastructural investment was substantial. Moscow wants to be seen as a significant regional counterweight to China and has solid credentials as a military ally following its successes in the Syrian civil war.

Tehran too welcomed the American retreat, but the Taliban’s resurgence required a pivot as Iran had developed a strong relationship with the Ghani government. The Iranians hosted talks between the Taliban and the Afghan government earlier in the summer and have been cultivating links with the group which has sparked heated public debate in Iran.

This reproachment has being reciprocated by the Taliban with assurances guaranteeing diplomats’ security. Iran has a valuable export trade with Afghanistan to protect but during the Taliban’s rule in the 1990s, relations between Afghanistan and Iran were strained. Iranians are mostly Shia – considered heretical under the Taliban’s strict interpretation of Sunni Islam. The Taliban and the Islamic State have regularly targeted the Persian-speaking Shiite Hazaras who have cultural and religious ties to Iran, but the Taliban has promised tolerance to this ethnic group in its recent propaganda.

For Afghanistan, the Great Game continues just with many more players.